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Many advances have been made over the last decades in describing, on the one
hand, the link between reward-based learning and decision-making, and on the other
hand, the link between impulsivity and decision-making. However, the association
between reward-based learning and impulsivity remains poorly understood. In this study,
we evaluated the association between individual differences in loss-minimizing and
gain-maximizing behavior in a learning-based probabilistic decision-making task and
individual differences in cognitive impulsivity. We found that low cognitive impulsivity
was associated both with a better performance minimizing losses and maximizing gains
during the task. These associations remained significant after controlling for mathematical
skills and gender as potential confounders. We discuss potential mechanisms through
which cognitive impulsivity might interact with reward-based learning and decision-
making.
Keywords: cognitive impulsivity, reward-based learning, economic decision-making, cognitive control
INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in understanding the neurocognitive basis of decision-making have emphasized
the key role of both reinforcement learning and impulsivity. On the one hand, computational
theories of reinforcement learning have provided a fruitful framework to describe and predict
adaptive decision-making on the basis of reward-based learning mechanism (Sutton and Barto,
1998; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Heekeren et al., 2007; Dayan and Niv, 2008; Eppinger et al.,
2011; Lee et al., 2012). On the other hand, impulsivity has been consistently linked to suboptimal
and maladaptive decision-making in healthy and clinical populations (Bechara, 2005; Franken
et al., 2008; Dalley et al., 2011; Kim and Lee, 2011; Ottaviani and Vandone, 2011). Despite these
recent advances in the understanding of the functional link between decision-making and reward-
based learning and impulsivity, little is still known about the relationship between impulsivity
and reward-based learning, since most part of the research on such processes has been made as
separate lines of inquiry. Here, we contribute to fill such gap by examining the relationship between
cognitive impulsivity and reward-based learning during a probabilistic decision-making task.
Reinforcement learning is a general framework for the study of the way in which natural and
artificial systems optimize their behavior by learning to predict the consequences of their actions in
the environment. As such, reinforcement learning provides and important theoretical perspective
for understanding and modeling adaptive decision-making processes in both in humans and in
non-human systems (Dayan and Niv, 2008; Lee et al., 2012). The reinforcement learning literature
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has distinguished between learning from negative feedback (i.e.,
loss-learning) and learning from positive feedback (i.e., gain-
learning; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Samanez-Larkin et al.,
2010; Voon et al., 2010; Cavanagh et al., 2011; Knutson et al.,
2011; San Martín et al., 2013; Kuhnen, 2015; Kuhnen and Miu,
2015). In laboratory settings these systematic propensities to
seek gains and to avoid losses have been studied using the
concepts of gain-maximization and loss-minimization, where
gain-maximization refers to the ability of obtaining the best gain
in a gain scenario, and loss-minimization refers to the ability of
avoiding the worse loss in a loss scenario (Venkatraman et al.,
2011; San Martín et al., 2013, 2014).
In a parallel line of research, impulsivity has arisen as a
key ingredient of neurocognitive models of decision-making,
underscoring the deleterious effect of high levels of impulsivity
on decision-making patterns (Bechara, 2005; Dalley et al., 2011;
Kim and Lee, 2011; Ottaviani and Vandone, 2011). Impulsivity
is typically characterized as the tendency to act prematurely
with little or no forethought and as systematic failures
in suppressing inappropriate motor, cognitive or emotional
responses (Durana and Barnes, 1993; Meda et al., 2009). Here,
we measured impulsivity using the “cognitive reflection test”
(CRT), an instrument that emphasizes the cognitive dimension of
impulsivity, this is, the tendency to make rash choices without an
appropriate evaluation of the alternatives. The CRT is composed
of three items designed to elicit an intuitive but incorrect
response (“lures”) when approaching a reasoning problem that
actually requires a slow and reflexive response. Accordingly, it has
been used as a measure of both cognitive reflection and cognitive
impulsivity (Cokely and Kelley, 2009; Johnson et al., 2012; Baron
et al., 2015; Cueva et al., 2015).
Interestingly, there are various parallels between findings
linking reward-based learning and decision-making and findings
linking impulsivity and decision-making. More remarkable,
recent research has highlighted the role of the dopaminergic
system both in reward-learning (Frank et al., 2004; Klein et al.,
2007; Schönberg et al., 2007; Pizzagalli et al., 2008; Eppinger
et al., 2011; Jocham et al., 2014; Cox et al., 2015) and impulsivity
(Kalivas and Volkow, 2005; Dalley et al., 2007; Pattij and
Vanderschuren, 2008; Besson et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2009; Eagle
et al., 2011; Buckholtz et al., 2016). Specifically, low availability
of dopamine D2/3-like receptors in the striatum is associated
both with bad performance in reward-based learning (Klein
et al., 2007; Jocham et al., 2014) and with high impulsivity
(Dalley et al., 2007; Besson et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2009).
Here, we directly evaluated the hypothesis that high cognitive
impulsivity, as measured with the CRT, will be associates with a
worse performance maximizing gains and minimizing losses in
learning-based decision-making.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-one healthy, right-handed, adult volunteers (12 women,
9 men) participated in this study (ages, 18–25 years; Mean
= 21.76). Participants were financially compensated for their
time ($7/h). They received an extra bonus (Mean = $3; SD =
$1.5) which was proportional to the points earned during the
experimental session. All participants signed a voluntary consent
form in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki, in addition
to the approval granted by the ethical committee of Universidad
Diego Portales.
Tasks and Procedures
Decision-Making Task
Weused a probabilistic decision-making task has been previously
used by San Martín et al. (2013, 2014) to study the event-
related brain potentials associated with learning and decision-
making. The primary goal of the task is to learn, by trial and
error, the probabilistic association between a set of symbols and
the probability of winning vs. losing on each trial, and then
use that information to choose between a small and a large
bet on each trial. Before data collection, subjects were told that
each trial would start with the presentation of two symbols,
and that some symbols tended to precede losses whereas others
tended to precede gains. Participants were informed that the
probabilistic relationship between symbols and outcomes would
remain constant during the session, that they would win or lose
points according to the amount of their bets (i.e., 8 or 2 points) in
every trial, and that at the end of the session they would receive
a monetary reward in proportion to the points collected in the
decision-making task.
Each experimental session began with a 20-trial practice with
each participant seated in front of a computer screen. For the
practice sessions we used a set of symbols specifically selected to
differ from the set of symbols that posteriorly were used during
data collection. After the initial practice, subjects performed 600
trials over course of a single experimental session divided into
30∼1.7 min blocks. Feedback about the cumulative performance
of the participant (i.e., number of points collected) was provided
after the first half and at the end of the session.
The temporal deployment of the task is represented in the
Figure 1A. Each trial started with the presentation of a pair
of symbols and a fixation cross in the center of the screen
for 1500ms. The symbols were randomly selected, without
replacement, from a set of 20 unique pairs of Hiragana characters.
Figure 1B display all-possible combinations of symbols and
their corresponding associated probability of winning or losing
in each trial. After an interstimulus interval (ISI) jittered
between 100 and 300ms, the numerals “8” and “2” were
displayed as wager alternatives, which were randomly selected
to appear at the left or at the right of a fixation cross. Subjects
choose their wager preference by pressing a keyboard button
matching the location of the chosen alternative in the screen.
Feedback about the outcome of the trial was presented after
an ISI jittered between 600 and 1000ms. The wagered points
appeared in a green box if the subject won on that trial
or in a red box if the participant lost on that trial. If no
response was selected within 1200ms after the presentation
of the wager alternatives, a “no response” message and a box
showing a lost of eight points was displayed. The following
trial started after an intertrial interval jittered between 800 and
1200ms.
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Experimental design. On each trial subjects had to pay attention to a pair of symbols and a fixation cross in the center of the screen. Then, they had to
choose their wager preference by pressing the button in a keyboard that matches the side of the screen where their corresponding preference was located. Feedback
about the outcome of the bet was presented in a green box if the subject won on that trial or in a red box if the participant lost on that trial. The numeral presented in
the box corresponded to the amount of points obtained in each trial, in correspondence with the wager previously selected. (B) Cues and win probability. Symbols
were randomly selected from a set of 20 different pairs of “Hiragana” characters, without replacement. The panel displays all-possible combinations of symbols and
their corresponding associated probability of winning vs. losing on each trial.
The outcome of the bet (i.e., winning or losing the
wagered points) was probabilistically determined according to
the probability of winning [p(win)] associated with the pair
of symbols presented on each particular trial (Figure 1B). The
p(win) associated with each pair of symbols corresponded to an
adjustment from 50% according to the increment or decrement
of p(win) associated with each symbol, namely: p(win) = 0.5 +
pL + pR, where pL and pR are the adjustments associated with
the symbol presented to the left and right of the screen. For
instance, the symbols presented in the Figure 1A represent the
pair of symbols A and Z (see Figure 1B) which were associated
to the following probability of winning: p(win)AZ = chance
+ p(win)A + p(win)Z = 0.5 + 0.3 − 0.3 = 0.50. Optimal
behavior in the task entailed betting eight points each time that
a likely winning pair [i.e., p(win) > 0.5] appeared, and betting
two points each time that a likely losing pair [i.e., p(win) < 0.5]
was presented.
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)
The CRT (Frederick, 2005) is composed of three items that are
designed to elicit an intuitive but incorrect response (“lures”) in
face to a reasoning problem that requires a slow and reflexive
response. The test includes the following questions:
(a) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more
than the ball. How much does the ball cost? _______ cents.
(b) If it takes 5 machines 5min to make 5 widgets, how long
would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? _______
min.
(c) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch
doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the
entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half
of the lake? _______ days.
A correct resolution of the test problems requires inhibiting
or re-evaluating the first answer that pop up in the mind, to
posteriorly reason and found the correct answer. In other words,
it requires the inhibition of the so-called “system 1” (fast and
intuitive) and the activation of the so-called “system 2” (slow and
reflexive) (Evans, 2011). For example, the “bat and ball problem”
is designed to elicit the intuitive answer “10¢” in conditions
where the correct solution is “5¢.” The answers to (b) and (c)
items are “5min” and “47 days” respectively. In order to assess the
performance in the CRT we used the same procedure in previous
studies (Frederick, 2005; Oechssler et al., 2009). Specifically, we
counted the number of correct responses and give one point for
every correct answer. This procedure gave us a range of four
points between 0 and 3. As in previous studies (Campitelli and
Labollita, 2010; Hoppe and Kusterer, 2011), participants were
instructed to answers the questions with paper and pencil without
time restrictions.
Behavioral Data Analysis
As already described, the probabilistic decision-making task that
we used consisted of a series of trials where the subjects choose
the amount of their bets (8 or 2) in response to a pair of cues
that are associated with a specific probability of winning vs.
losing. In the context of this task gain-learning can be defined
as learning to detect trials with a probability of >50% of winning
and bet high (i.e., 8) on those trials, whereas loss-learning can be
defined as learning to detect trials with a probability of <50%
of winning and bet low (i.e., 2) on those trials. In order to
test if CRT scores predicts gain-learning and loss-learning, we
pulled participants data from each trial to perform two separate
logistic regression models. In the first model (Equation 1) we
used CRT scores, gender and mathematical skills as predictors of
choice behavior (i.e., betting high vs. betting low) in trials with a
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probability >50% of winning (i.e., gain-learning). In the second
model (Equation 2) we used the same variables as predictors of
choice behavior in trials with a probability<50% of winning (i.e.,
loss-learning).We introducedmathematical skills as a control for
the ability to identify the correct answer in the CRT. This ability
was measured using the score on the mathematical section of
the National University Admission Test in Chile. Both the CRT
and the score on the mathematical test were z-scored in order to
facilitate their comparison. Thus, we evaluate the direct influence
of cognitive impulsivity on choice behavior controlling for gender
and mathematical skills as potential confounders.
p
(
high bet| winning trial
)
=
1
1+ e−z
, (1)
where z = β0 + βcrt × CRT+ βgen × gender
+ βmath × math skills + ε
p
(
low bet| loosing trial
)
=
1
1+ e−z
, (2)
where z = β0 + βcrt × CRT+ βgen × gender
+ βmath × math skills + ε
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
Table 1 shows the percentage of subjects who correctly answer
the CRT by the number of questions answered. Only 4.76% of
participants correctly responded to the three items, whereas the
42.86% did not achieve any correct answer. The mean of correct
answers was 0.95 (SD = 0.21). These results are within the range
of previous studies. For example, in his original study, Frederick
(2005) reports ranges that go from amean of 0.57 correct answers
in students from the Universidad de Toledo to a mean of 2.18 in
students from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. There
was a significant effect for gender, t(19) = 2.1877, p < 0.001, with
males receiving higher scores (M= 1.44, SD= 1.01) than females
(M = 0.58, SD = 0.79) on the CRT. This gender difference
has also been found in previous studies, e.g., Frederick (2005),
Oechssler et al. (2009), and Hoppe and Kusterer (2011).
Interestingly, participants CRT’s scores were not
significatively correlated neither with reaction times on the
task, r(19) = 0.06, p = 0.78 nor with the number of no responses
per participant, r(19) = −0.20, p = 0.36, although there was an
almost significant trend to correlate with the frequency of “too
early” responses, r(19) =−0.41, p= 0.06.
A visual inspection of choice behavior across blocks (Figure 2)
suggests the existence of a difference in learning between high-
impulsive participants, defined as the subjects who scored above
the median of the distribution of the CRT scores, and low-
impulsive participants, defined as the subjects who scored below
the median of the distribution of the CRT scores. A t-test on the
observed probability that low-impulsive participants would bet
high on likely winning vs. the observed probability of doing so on
likely losing trials found significant differences whenwe collapsed
and analyzed the last five blocks of the task (i.e., blocks 26–30)
(Mwinning–trials = 51%, SDwinning–trials = 18%; Mlosing–trials =
30%, SDlosing–trials = 21%; t = 2.57, p = 0.02), but not when we
TABLE 1 | Percentage of subjects whit correct answers by the number of
items.
No. of correct answers % Participants in the sample
0 42.86
1 23.81
2 28.57
3 4.76
n = 21.
collapsed and analyzed the first five blocks of the task (t = 1.23,
p = 0.22). We did not find significant differences when we
repeated this procedure for high-impulsive participants (last five
blocks, t = 0.12, p = 0.9; first five blocks, t = −0.85, p = 0.4). In
summary only low-impulsive subjects, as measured with the CRT,
learned to distinguish between likely winning and likely losing
trials.
Cognitive Impulsivity Predicts Gain
Learning and Loss Learning
On average, participants collected 111 points during the task
(SD = 262.1), with males achieving a mean of 197.3 points
(SD = 260.83) and females a mean of 46.7 points (SD =
254.62); nevertheless such difference did not reached statistical
significance [t(19) = 0.017, p = 0.199]. Importantly, individual
differences in this measure of overall performance scaled with
CRT scores (r = 0.75, p = 0.001; Figure 3). In order to
disentangle the specific contribution of gain-learning and loss-
learning to this association, we performed two separated logistic
regression models with CRT scores, gender, and mathematical
skills as predictors of choice behavior (see Materials andMethods
section). Detailed results can be observed in Table 2. Across
participants, we found that CRT scores scaled both with the log
odds for the tendency to bet high on likely winning trials (i.e.,
gain-learning) (b = 0.256; p = 0.000), and the log odds for the
tendency to bet low on likely losing trials (i.e., loss-learning)
(b = 0.409; p < 0.000). This was the case even after controlling
for gender and mathematical skills.
DISCUSSION
Our results shed new light on the relationship between reward-
based learning and cognitive impulsivity. Specifically, they show
an association between the performance in the CRT, a measure
of cognitive impulsivity, and the performance in a reward-based
probabilistic decision making task. Our data analyses allowed us
to disentangle the specific contribution of gain and loss learning
to this association. The analysis showed, as we expected, that both
loss and gain learning were positively associated with CRT scores,
an association that remains significant even after controlling for
mathematical skills and gender as potential confounders. This
suggests that low cognitive impulsivity is related with better
performance on both betting high on likely winning situations
and betting low on likely losing situations.
Our study was motivated in part by previous research showing
that both impulsivity and reward-based learning are associated
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FIGURE 2 | Differences in choice behavior across blocks for low-impulsive subjects (left) and high-impulsive subjects (right). The vertical axis shows the
choice behavior (betting high) for likely winning trials (green), neutral trials (gray), and likely losing trials (red) across the task. Every block represents 20 single trials in
our gambling task. Shaded areas indicate SEM for each trace.
FIGURE 3 | Association between CRT scores and points earned during
the task. Across participants, lower cognitive impulsivity, as measured by the
CRT, was associated with a better overall performance in our probabilistic
decision-making task (r = 0.75, p = 0.001).
with dopaminergic signaling (Frank et al., 2004; Kalivas and
Volkow, 2005; Dalley et al., 2007; Klein et al., 2007; Schönberg
et al., 2007; Pattij and Vanderschuren, 2008; Pizzagalli et al.,
2008; Besson et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2009; Eagle et al., 2011;
Eppinger et al., 2011; Jocham et al., 2014; Cox et al., 2015;
Buckholtz et al., 2016). Our results supported the hypothesis
of an association between individual differences in cognitive
impulsivity and individual differences in learning-based choice
TABLE 2 | Association between CRT scores and gain and loss learning.
Choice behavior
Gain learning Loss learning
Model
predictors
B SE B p B SE B p
Constant −0.027 0.042 0.514 0.735 0.045 0.000
CRT 0.256 0.034 0.000 0.409 0.038 0.000
Gender 0.124 0.074 0.094 −0.696 0.078 0.000
Math −0.109 0.032 0.001 0.267 0.035 0.000
behavior. These results contribute to the study of the interaction
between these neurocognitive processes and decision-making.
An unresolved question, however, is the causal directionality
behind the associations that we reported here. Here we briefly
discuss two potential explanations that are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. One possibility is that individual differences
in reward-based learning explain individual differences in
cognitive impulsivity. This possibility is partially supported by
studies on attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and
Parkinson’s disease, which have proposed that the heightened
impulsivity that characterized these conditions is partially caused
by an atypical oversensitivity to positive rewards compared to
negative rewards (Frank et al., 2004, 2006, 2007; Williams and
Dayan, 2005; Frank, 2006; Luman et al., 2009, 2010; Maia and
Frank, 2011). Another possibility is that impulsivity precedes
choice behavior, modulating the ability to learn the association
between cues and winning/losing probabilities. According to this
view, individual differences in cognitive control could explain
individual differences in reward-learning. This second view is
indirectly supported by findings on the influence of impulsivity
on addiction and maladaptive decision-making patterns, which
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has pointed to impulsivity as a premorbid risk factor of addictive
disorders and poor decision-making (Bechara, 2005; Dalley
et al., 2007; Verdejo-García et al., 2008; MacKillop et al.,
2011).
Finally, recent studies have started to shed light on the
association between decision-making in the laboratory and real
life outcomes (Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009; Knutson et al.,
2011; Kuhnen, 2015). For example, Knutson et al. (2011)
have shown a positive correlation between gain learning and
assets accumulation and a negative correlation between loss
learning and debt accumulation. Several studies have shown
that debt accumulation is also associated with high levels of
impulsivity in decision-making (Attitude et al., 2006; Joireman
et al., 2010; Ottaviani and Vandone, 2011; Gathergood, 2012;
Mansfield et al., 2013; Achtziger et al., 2015), and that saving
behavior and economic wealth is associated with high levels
of self-control (i.e., low impulsivity) (Laibson et al., 1998;
Mastrobuoni and Weinberg, 2009; Moffitt et al., 2011). An issue
for future research will be to determine the causal directionality
or meditational effects behind these associations. In the context
of the aforementioned studies and the results that we reported
here, an interesting direction for future studies could be to
evaluate whether cognitive impulsivity acts as a mediator of the
suggested relationship between reinforcement learning skills and
financial life outcomes. Future research could also delve in these
associations by looking at their neurocognitive underpinnings
and by analyzing their behavioral implications in different
decision-making domains.
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